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THE EXTRATERRITORIAL ASSERTION OF LONG-ARM
JURISDICTION AND THE IMPACT ON THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL COMMUNITY: A
COMMENT AND SUGGESTED APPROACH
PETER S. LEVITT*
1.

INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court's decision in InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington' heralded the demise of the strictly territorial locus of in personam jurisdiction. 2 The InternationalShoe Court held that jurisdiction' could constitutionally be maintained over a foreign4 defendant if
"'minimum contacts" 5 existed between the defendant and the forum,
and if maintenance of the suit in the forum did not "offend 'traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.' " For the twelve years immediately following International Shoe, the Supreme Court significantly expanded the reach of the minimum contacts test.1 Following
* J.D. Candidate, 1988, University of Pennsylvania Law School; A.B., 1984,
Vassar College.
1 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
2 In Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878), the Court had stated that "no state
can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property without its territory." Id. at 722.
3 Unless otherwise indicated, the term "jurisdiction" describes in personam
jurisdiction.
" The term "foreign," as used herein and as applied to corporations, describes
parties incorporated by a state within the United States other than the forum state. The
term "alien" describes parties who, due to incorporation or nationality, are subjects of a
foreign country.
' See Cohen, In PersonamJurisdictionin Federal Courts over Foreign Corporations: The Need for a FederalLong Arm Statute, 14 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 59
(1985); Jay, "Minimum Contacts" as a Unified Theory of PersonalJurisdiction:A
Reappraisal,59 N.C.L. REV. 429 (1981); Comment, In PersonamJurisdiction over
Nonresident Manufacturers in Product Liability Actions, 63 MICH. L. REV. 1028
(1965).
6 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
7 Louis, The Grasp of the Long-Arm Finally Exceeds its Reach: A Comment on
"World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson" and "Rush v. Savchuk," 58 N.C.L. REV. 407,
407-08 (1980).
(713)
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this lead, the state courts aggressively began to enact and extend the
reach of their long-arm statutes.' The Supreme Court made only one
attempt 9 to curb this trend until World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson' ° was decided in 1980.
Many factors undergird the Volkswagen decision, i x but the Supreme Court appeared particularly concerned that the aggressive application of state long-arm statutes over foreign defendants threatened the
very essence of federalism: the Court stated that one of the purposes of
the minimum contacts test was to "ensure that the States, through their
courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their
status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system."' 2 Having articulated
the particular and limited position of each state within the national
community, the Supreme Court recently had the opportunity to articulate a similarly limited position for the United States within the international community. In Asahi Metal Industries Co. v. Superior
3 the Court failed to make the most of its opportunity. 14
Court,"
The California Supreme Court's disposition of the Asahi case 5
strongly suggests that state courts in this country are not adequately
considering the commercial interests of the international community."6
This disregard comes at a particularly unfortunate time. World trade,
now worth approximately two trillion dollars annually, grew sevenfold
between 1970 and 1984.17 National boundaries no longer shelter doSee generally Comment, Long-Arm and Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction and the
FundamentalTest of Fairness, 69 MIcH. L. REV. 300 (1970) (discussing the history
of long-arm jurisdiction and the weakening of due process requirements for the assertion of in personam jurisdiction); Comment, supra note 5, at 1028 (In "order to provide a more convenient forum for their citizens, many state legislatures have enacted
'long-arm' statutes enabling suit to be brought in the state where the plaintiff resides."); Recent Developments, 14 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 585, 589 (1981) ("In
response to the fresh enunciation of due process standards in InternationalShoe and its
progeny, state legislatures enacted broad jurisdictional long-arm statutes.").
' In Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), the Court cautioned that the postInternationalShoe trend, which aggressively extended the reach of long-arm statutes,
did not herald "the eventual demise of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of
state courts." Id. at 251.

10 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
"1See infra notes 42-45, 74-83 and accompanying text.
444 U.S. at 292.
1s 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987), rev'g 39 Cal. 3d 35, 702 P.2d 543, 216 Cal. Rptr. 385
(1985).
14 The Court's holding and the positions of the Justices as to each issue are discussed infra notes 51-65 and accompanying text.
" 39 Cal. 3d 35, 702 P.2d 543, 216 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1985). The jurisdictional
grounds upon which the California Supreme Court decided this case are discussed infra Section 2.
10 See infra notes 138-49 and accompanying text.
17 Global Competition: The New Reality, WILSON Q., Summer 1985, at 42 (reviewing 2 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON INDUS. COMPETITIVENESS, GLOBAL COMPETI12

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol9/iss4/4

1987]

EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION

mestic industry: seventy percent of all goods made in the United States,
whether sold here or abroad, face alien competition in the marketplace.1 8 The transformation has been particularly acute with respect to
the phenomenal economic growth of Japan and other Pacific countries.
In 1977, the volume of United States trade across the Pacific exceeded
United States trade across the Atlantic for the first time.19 Pacific trade
now accounts for approximately one-quarter of all United States exports and one-third of all imports.2" Within this context of rapidly expanding international trade, the Asahi Court's mild appeal that state
courts heed the advice of Volkswagen and "consider the. . . policies of
other nations whose interests are affected by the assertion of jurisdiction"'" simply does not go far enough.
This Comment will first discuss the Asahi case and the jurisdictional grounds upon which it was settled." Next, several factors inadequately analyzed by the Asahi court - the ability of the defendant to
structure its conduct to avoid suit in a particular jurisdiction,'" the introduction of the United States' product liability law into the international commercial arena,' 4 and principles of international comity"5 will be discussed. Finally, this Comment will argue that the United
States, through its assertions of jurisdiction, should make a minimal
encroachment on the paramount interests of the international commercial community.' 6 A test which links the reasonableness of an assertion
of international jurisdiction to a particular alien manufacturer's position in the production/distribution chain will then be proposed.
2. Asahi

AND

THE JURISDICTIONAL

GROUNDS UPON WHICH

IT

WAS SETTLED

In 1978, Gary Zurcher was severely injured and his wife was
killed when his motorcycle collided with another vehicle.' 8 The accident
was allegedly caused by a sudden loss of air and explosion in the rear
tire of the motorcycle. Zurcher and his wife were California residents
TION: THE NEW REALITY

(1985)).

18 Id.
19 2 GOLDEN STATE REP.,
20

May, 1986, at 10.

Id.

21 Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 107 S. Ct. 1026, 1034 (1987).

See
See
2 See
2 See
11 See
22
21

infra Section
infra Section
infra Section
infra Section
infra Section

2.
3.1.
3.2.
3.3.
4.1.

:1 See infra Section 4.2.
25

Asahi, 39 Cal. 3d 35, 40-41, 702 P.2d 543, 544, 216 Cal. Rptr. 385, 387

(1985).
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and the accident occurred in California.2"
Zurcher filed a product liability suit in California. He alleged that
the tire, tube, and sealant were defective. Cheng Shin Rubber Industrial Company, the Taiwanese corporation that manufactured the tube,
was among the defendants named in the complaint. Cheng Shin filed a
cross-complaint for indemnity against various co-defendants nd against
Asahi Metal Industries Co., Ltd.30
Zurcher eventually settled all his claims against the defendants,
leaving only Cheng Shin's indemnity action against Asahi.31 Asahi is a
Japanese corporation. It is a major producer of valve assemblies and
had manufactured the assembly of the allegedly defective tube. 2 Asahi
maintained no offices, property or agents in California. It solicited no
business and made no sales there.3 3 Between 1978 and 1982, Asahi sold
approximately 1,350,000 valve stem assemblies to Cheng Shin. Proceeds from these sales accounted for 1.24% and 0.44% of Asahi's total
income in 1981 and 1982, respectively. 4 All of these sales took place in
Taiwan and all of the shipments were sent from Japan to Taiwan. 5
The tubes sold in California were marketed by Cheng Shin through a
related company that was incorporated in California. Approximately
twenty percent of Cheng Shin's total sales in the United States were
allegedly to California. 6
Asahi moved to quash service on the ground that California's exercise of jurisdiction over it would violate the restrictions placed upon
state jurisdiction by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.37 Writing for the Supreme Court of California, Chief Justice
Bird held that the exercise of jurisdiction was proper. The court relied
primarily on the Supreme Court's decision in World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson to reach its conclusion.
In Volkswagen, respondents had purchased an Audi automobile
from petitioner Seaway Volkswagen, Inc. (Seaway).38 While driving
this car through Oklahoma the following year, respondents were involved in a collision with another vehicle. The injured respondents
29

Id.

30 Id.
31 107
32

S. Ct. 1026, 1030 (1987).

Id. at 1029-30.

3 Id. at 1031.
34

35

Id. at 1030.
Id.

Id.
California's long-arm statute authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction "on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States." CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973).
" World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 288 (1980).
36

37
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brought a product liability suit in which they alleged that their injuries
resulted from defective design and placement of the car's fuel system.39
Respondents joined the following defendants: the primary manufacturer, Audi NSU; the importer, Volkswagen of America; petitioner
World-Wide Volkswagen, distributor of Audis to retail dealers in New
York, New Jersey, and Connecticut; and petitioner Seaway, the retail
dealer who had sold respondents their car in New York. 40 Neither the
primary manufacturer nor the importer contested jurisdiction in the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 41 but the petitioners maintained that
Oklahoma's assertion of jurisdiction over them was unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court agreed with the petitioners and, in broad dicta,
fashioned the test by which any particular member of the production/
distribution chain could be subjected to the jurisdiction of another forum. The Court focused on whether each member of the chain, through
its "conduct and connection with the forum," could have reasonably
foreseen "being haled into court there.""' The Court stated that the
assertion of jurisdiction was proper where "a corporation

. .

delivers

its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they
will be purchased by consumers in the forum State." 4 Applying these
principles, the Supreme Court found that the presence of the Audi in
Oklahoma was, from petitioners' point of view, a "fortuitous circumstance": they had not availed themselves of the "privileges and benefits
of Oklahoma law,"" but had instead restricted the scope of their sales
to the New York tri-state area.'8
In Asahi, the California Supreme Court distinguished Volkswagen
by stating that, while the presence of the Audi in Oklahoma was fortuitous, "Asahi's valve assembly.

. .

was sold in [California] as part of a

finished product [and] reached California in the stream of commerce. "16
The court found that, although Asahi "did not design or control the
system of distribution that carried its valve assemblies into California,' 7 it knew4 that some of the assemblies sold to Cheng Shin would
39
40

Id.

Id. at 288-89.

41 Id. at 288 n.3.

42 Id. at 297.
41 Id. at 298; ef. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984)
(jurisdiction properly asserted where a corporation "purposefully direct[s]" its products
at a state in a fashion that is not "random, isolated, or fortuitous").
44 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295.
45 Id. at 289.
4' Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 39 Cal. 3d 35, 47, 702 P.2d 543, 549,
216 Cal. Rptr. 385, 391 (1985).
47 Id. at 49, 702 P.2d at 550, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 392.
48 One of Cheng Shin's managers stated in an affidavit that "I am informed and
believe that Asahi was fully aware that valve stem assemblies sold to [Cheng Shin] and
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be incorporated into tubes and sold in California.49 The court held that
"the minimum contact requirement is satisfied where, as here, the
manufacturer is aware that a substantial number of its products will be
sold in the forum state." '
The Supreme Court reversed. The Court acknowledged that the
"'constitutional touchstone' of the determination whether an exercise of
personal jurisdiction comports with due process 'remains whether the
defendant purposefully established "minimum contacts" in the forum
state.' "51 The Court was, however, unable to base its holding on a
minimum contacts analysis. Writing for herself and only three other
Justices,52 Justice O'Connor stated that the requisite minimum contacts
existed only where "an action of the defendant [was] purposefully directed toward the forum State."53 The plurality did not believe that,
within this context, Asahi's "mere act of placing the product into the
stream [of commerce]" was an act purposefully directed toward California.5" Purporting to rely on Volkswagen, the plurality stated that a defendant's subjective knowledge of the ultimate destination of its product
was not germane to the due process analysis.55 Asahi's subjective
awareness that some of the products containing its valves were being
sold in California did not, therefore, convert the "mere act" of placing
its valves in the stream of commerce into an act "purposefully directed"
toward California."
to others would end up throughout the United States and in California." Id. at 48 n.4,
702 P.2d at 549 n.4, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 392 n.4.
49 Id. at 48, 702 P.2d at 549, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 392.
50 Id. at 51-52, 702 P.2d at 552, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 394.
51 Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 107 S. Ct. 1026, 1031 (1987) (quoting
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985)).
2 Justices Powell and Scalia, and Chief Justice Rehnquist agreed with Justice
O'Connor's interpretation of the stream of commerce doctrine and with her application
of the minimum contacts test.
53 107 S. Ct. at 1033.
54

Id.

Id. at 1032-33 (citing Max Daetwyler Corp. v. R. Meyer, 762 F.2d 290, 299
(3d Cir. 1985)). In the domestic setting, it is far from certain whether a manufacturer's
subjective awareness that its product will be swept by the stream of commerce into the
forum state is relevant to the due process analysis. See infra notes 83, 107 (last paragraph), & 162-64.
"' Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1032-33. In Asahi itself, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun, disagreed with the plurality's construction of the
stream of commerce doctrine and stated that jurisdiction may properly be asserted over
a defendant who is "[subjectively] aware that the final product is being marketed in the
forum State." Id. at 1035 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and in the judgment). Justice Brennan saw "no need" for an additional showing that the defendant had purposefully directed its activity toward the forum state. Id. Nevertheless, he did concede that
"this is one of those rare cases" where jurisdiction could be denied on "fairness grounds
despite the existence of minimum contacts." Id. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices
White and Blackmun stated that it was not necessary to reach the question of minimum
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol9/iss4/4
51
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With the Court divided as to whether minimum contacts existed
between Asahi and California, the reversal was based instead on the
"reasonableness" prong 57 of InternationalShoe: eight Justices5 8 agreed
that California's assertion of jurisdiction over Asahi would "offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." 9 The Court
stated that whether an assertion of jurisdiction was "reasonable" depended in each instance on an evaluation of several factors."0 These
factors included the relative burdens to the plaintiff and defendant, the
contacts where, as here, the assertion of jurisdiction did not meet minimum requirements inherent in the concept of "fair play and substantial justice." Id. at 1038 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and in the judgment). Justice Stevens then added: "I would
be inclined to conclude that a regular course of dealing that results in deliveries of over
100,000 units annually over a period of several years would constitute 'purposeful
availment. . .. ' " Id. at 1038. It appears, however, that Justice Stevens's conclusion is
based on an incorrect statement of the facts. See id. at 1030 & supra note 36 and
accompanying text (noting that Cheng Shin installed 100,000 Asahi valves into its
tubes, although in 1981 and 1982, only 20% of Cheng Shin's United States sales were
in California).
57 Initially, the requirement that the assertion of jurisdiction be "reasonable" was
inextricably linked with the minimum contacts requirement. See International Shoe v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945) ("It is evident that these operations establish
sufficient contacts or ties with the state of the forum to make it reasonable and just,
according to our traditional conception of fair play and substantial justice, to permit the
state to enforce the obligations which appellant incurred there."); see also J.
FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 125 n.9 (1985) ("The
language of the InternationalShoe opinion sets out the 'fair play and substantial justice' formulation as the standard against which the sufficiency of the minimum contacts
test is to be measured, thus tying the two standards together."). Subsequent decisions
appeared to split the standard into a two-prong test: the Volkswagen Court characterized the minimum contacts inquiry as a threshold question, and deemed unnecessary
further inquiry into "reasonableness" if minimum contacts between the defendant and
the forum did not exist. 444 U.S. at 294; see J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A.
MILLER, supra; see also Hendrickson v. Reg 0 Co., 657 F.2d 9, 14 (3d Cir. 1981)
("[T]he Court made it clear that the first consideration must be the defendant's contacts
with the forum."). Recent Supreme Court cases recognizing the distinction between
"general" and "specific" jurisdiction appear to focus the due process analysis entirely
on the minimum contacts question. See, e.g., Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia,
S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-15 (1984) (requiring that contacts be "continuous and
systematic" where plaintiff's cause of action is unrelated to defendant's activity within
the forum) (citing Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952)). The
"reasonableness" prong was recently revitalized as an independent jurisdictional consideration in Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985) ("Once it has been
decided that a defendant purposefully established minimum contacts within the forum
State, these contacts may be considered in light of other factors to determine whether
the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with 'fair play and substantial
justice.' ") (quoting InternationalShoe, 326 U.S. at 320). For a general discussion of

Burger King, see Perschbecher, Minimum Contacts Reapplied: Mr. Justice Brennan
Has It His Way in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 1986 ARIz. ST. L.J. 585.
88 Justice Scalia was the only member of the Court who refused to join this part
of the opinion.
59 Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 107 S.Ct. 1026, 1033 (1987) (quoting
InternationalShoe, 326 U.S. at 316).
60 107 S.Ct. at 1033.
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interests of the forum state, the interstate interest in efficient dispute
resolution, and, in the international setting, the interest in "furthering
the fundamental substantive policies of other nations."'" Applying these
factors to the facts of the case, the Court held that the assertion of
jurisdiction was unreasonable: the Japanese defendant was forced to
61
litigate in a distant forum governed by an unfamiliar legal system,
while California had a "slight" interest in resolving the indemnification
dispute between two alien litigants.6 3 The Court disapproved of the
California Supreme Court's failure to include the interests of alien nations in its due process analysis:64 the Court cautioned that state courts
should be "unwilling to find the serious burdens on an alien defendant
outweighed by the minimal interests . . . of the plaintiff or the forum
'65
State."
3. FACTORS INADEQUATELY ANALYZED: INEQUITIES AND ADVERSE
EFFECTS EMANATING FROM THE Asahi DECISION

As noted above,6 6 the California Supreme Court based its jurisdictional analysis on factors that had been developed and applied in the
domestic setting.67 The United States Supreme Court considered only
briefly the interests of alien nations when it reached the opposite conclusion.6 8 Neither decision included an analysis of certain factors which
should always be considered when issues of international dimension are
6I

Id. at 1034.

See infra note 169 and accompanying text.
6 It will be proposed that even where a domestic plaintiff remains a party to a
product liability dispute against an alien component manufacturer, the interest of the
plaintiff's forum will almost always be outweighed by the interest of the United States
in preserving international commercial stability. See infra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
" See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
65 107 S. Ct. at 1035. The Asahi decision thus places the lower courts in a confusing position. Determining whether the requisite minimum contacts exist between the
defendant and the forum has always been the primary component of the Supreme
Court's jurisdictional analysis. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958); McGee
v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-23 (1957); see Lilly,Jurisdictionover
Domestic and Alien Defendants, 69 VA. L. REv. 85, 86-116 (1983) ("chant[ing] the
litany" of Supreme Court jurisdiction cases from Pennoyer to Volkswagen); supra note
57. But the division of the Asahi Court on the minimum contacts issue and the grounds
upon which the decision was ultimately based suggest that the minimum contacts test is
no longer the "constitutional touchstone" of the due process analysis. To base every
jurisdictional question on an unstructured "reasonableness" inquiry would derogate the
special need to infuse the international commercial system with stability and predictability. See generally infra Section 4.
66 See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
67 See infra note 137 and accompanying text for the factors specifically discussed
by the California Supreme Court.
68 See supra notes 21 & 65 and accompanying text.
62
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at stake. These factors include the ability of a particular member of the
production/distribution chain to structure its conduct to avoid jurisdiction in a particular United States forum,"9 the effect that aggressive
extraterritorial application of domestic long-arm statutes might have on
international trade and product liability insurance,"0 and considerations
of international comity."1
3.1. The "Stream of Commerce" and the Diminished Capacity of
Secondary Manufacturers to Avoid Suit in a ParticularForum
In several respects, the stream of commerce doctrine 2 reflects
modern economic reality. The Volkswagen Court" was well aware that
the relaxation of the restrictions imposed by the due process clause on
state assertions of jurisdiction resulted from a "fundamental transformation in the American economy."'7 Although the Volkswagen Court
specifically addressed the transformation in the national economy,"6 the
change in the international economic structure has been no less striking.1 8 The stream of commerce doctrine also acknowledges that alien
manufacturers in the modern business world rarely deliver their products directly to United States consumers. These manufacturers instead
rely on extended chains of distribution to disseminate their products
" See infra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
70 See infra notes 95-108 and accompanying text.
7
See infra notes 109-33 and accompanying text.
71 For a general discussion of the stream of commerce doctrine and the economic
realities that support its adoption by the courts, see Comment, PersonalJurisdictionin
the Post-World-Wide Volkswagen Era Using Market Analysis to Determine the
Reach ofJurisdiction,60 WASH. L. REv. 155 (1984); Note, Civil Procedure- North
CarolinaAdopts the Stream of Commerce Theory of Jurisdiction:A Step In the Right
Direction - Bush v. BASF Wyandotte Corp., 20 WAKE FORiES L. REv. 737 (1984).
7 Because a majority of the Asahi Court could not agree on the parameters and
application of the stream of commerce doctrine as it had been fashioned in Volkswagen,
the latter opinion is referred to directly. Cf Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 737 (1983)
(noting that plurality opinions are not binding but "should obviously be the point of
reference for further discussion of the issue").
'4World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980).
7sQuoting from McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-23
(1957), the Court observed:
[t]oday many commercial transactions touch two or more States and
may involve parties separated by the full continent. With this increasing
nationalization of commerce has come a great increase in the amount of
business conducted by mail across state lines. At the same time modern
transportation and communication have made it much less burdensome for
a party sued to defend himself in a State where he engages in economic
activity.
444 U.S. at 293.
7s See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
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throughout the country." By "increasing the distribution of its products
through indirect sales within the forum, a [primary] manufacturer benefits legally from the protection provided by the laws of the forum state
for its products, as well as economically from indirect sales to forum
residents." 8 The doctrine is thus grounded in fundamental notions of
fairness and quid pro quo: a manufacturer should not be able to profit
from the sale of its finished product within a particular state while
insulating itself from the reach of the state's long-arm jurisdiction. To
allow an alien manufacturer to shield itself from both jurisdiction and

liability for damages simply by employing a complex distribution
scheme would "permit a legal technicality to subvert justice and economic reality."' As it is understood by the Asahi plurality,8 1 the
stream of commerce doctrine thus focuses on whether each participant
in the production/distribution chain "purposefully avail[ed] itself of the
privilege of conducting activities with the forum state, thus invoking the
benefits and protections of its laws."182 Presumably, a participant who
7 Oswalt v. Scripto, Inc., 616 F.2d 191, 200 (5th Cir. 1980); Gray v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 442, 176 N.E.2d 761, 766 (1961);
Charles Gendler & Co. v. Telecom Equip. Corp., 102 N.J. 460, 479, 508 A.2d 1127,
1137 (1986); Note, The Long-Arm Reach of the Courts Under the Effects Test After
Kulko v. Superior Court, 65 VA. L. REv. 175, 178-79 (1979).
78 DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 285 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1085 (1981); cf. Gray, 22 Ill.
2d at 442, 176 N.E.2d at 766 ("The
fact that the benefit [which the manufacturer] derives from [the forum state's] laws is
an indirect one ... does not make it any the less essential to the conduct of his business."); McCombs v. Cerro Rentals, 622 S.W.2d 822, 827 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981) (The
manufacturer "indirectly availed itself of the laws of Tennessee by injecting its products
into the stream of national commerce."); Note, supra note 77, at 179; Comment, supra
note 72, at 171.
79 DeJames, 654 F.2d at 285; Poyner v. Erma Werke GmbH, 618 F.2d 1186,
1190 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980); Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. Costruzioni
Aeronautiche Giovanni Agusta, S.p.A., 553 F. Supp. 328, 334 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Currie,
The Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdictionin Illinois, 1963
U. ILL. L.F. 533, 552.
80 Gendler, 102 N.J. at 479, 508 A.2d at 1137 (quoting Certismo v. Heidelberg
Co., 122 N.J. Super. 1, 12, 298 A.2d 298, 304 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1972)); cf.
Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatwerke, 509 F.2d 1137, 1144 (7th Cir. 1975) ("We
look to the economic and commercial realities of the case, and . . . it is not within...
the concepts of fairness [to allow the primary manufacturer] to insulate himself ... by
using an intermediary or professing ignorance of the ultimate destination of his products."); Gray, 22 Ill. 2d at 443, 176 N.E.2d at 766 ("Unless they are applied in recognition of the changes brought about by technological and economic progress, jurisdictional concepts .. .lose their relations to reality, and injustice . . . is promoted.");
Currie, supra note 79.
8'See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
82 Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 107 S.Ct. 1026, 1031 (1987) (quoting
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). Additionally, the Volkswagen Court
pointed out that collateral financial benefit accruing to a manufacturer would not by
itself support jurisdiction. World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 299
(1980).
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has done so could reasonably foresee being haled into court in that
83

state.

The stream of commerce doctrine is, therefore, designed to permit
each participant in the production/distribution chain to decide whether
the benefits derived from doing business in a particular forum are outweighed by the concomitant burdens of litigating there. Those who
have purposefully availed themselves of the benefits of state laws are on
"clear notice" that they are subject to that state's jurisdictional reach;
thus alerted, they may "structure their primary conduct" to avoid suit
in that state.8"
Various courts have seized upon the language quoted above and
have carefully scrutinized whether manufacturers have structured their
conduct to avoid suit in a particular forum. In Oswalt v. Scripto, Inc.,"
the defendant, a Japanese manufacturer of cigarette lighters, delivered
several million lighters each year to its exclusive United States distributor. The distibutor, also a Japanese corporation, placed the lighters in
the stream of commerce for sale to the United States. The Texas plaintiff was injured by one of the lighters. Defendant maintained no office,
place of business, servant, employee, or director in any part of the
United States. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, concluded
that jurisdiction over the defendant was properly exercised. The court
noted that the defendant intended through its marketing scheme to
serve the entire United States, and that defendant did not "in any way
[attempt] to limit the states in which the lighters could be sold." 6 The
facts of Oswalt can be easily distinguished from those of Volkswagen:
the "distribution system [of the Japanese lighter manufacturer] was not
structured to gain some 'minimum assurance'.

. .

that the lighters

would not be sold in Texas,"8 7 while the commercial ties of the New
York retailer in Volkswagen were limited to several east coast states. 88
83 Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1032 (quoting Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297); see International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945); Ripple & Murphy, WorldWide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson: Reflections on the Road Ahead, 56 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 65, 68 (1980) (foresecability discussed by the Volkswagen Court depends
upon the manufacturer's purposeful availment of the privilege of conducting activities
in the forum); Comment, supra note 72, at 167.
84 Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
88 616 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1980).
88 Id. at 199-200.
87

Id. at 200.

For other examples of the scrutiny applied to the conduct of the party challenging jurisdiction, see Max Daetwyler Corp. v. R. Meyer, 762 F.2d 290, 299-300 (3d
Cir. 1985) (collecting stream of commerce cases in which manufacturers had sold product to distributor which served forum); DeMelo v. Toche Marine, Inc., 711 F.2d 1260,
1271 (5th Cir. 1983) (New York manufacturer of spray paint, having little direct contact with forum in which plaintiff is injured by its product, but having shipped its
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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The means by which a primary manufacturer may avoid suit in a
particular state are not, however, available to the alien component
manufacturer. 8 Component parts are usually sold by component manufacturers to primary manufacturers pursuant to a discrete contract. 90
products into the forum state, failed to "structure[] its primary conduct to avoid contact
with the forum state"); Plant Food Co-op v. Wolfkill Food & Fertilizer, 633 F.2d 155,
159 (9th Cir. 1980) (Canadian fertilizer dealer, knowing its product was bound for
Montana, "could have objected or made other arrangements if it found exposure to
Montana's long-arm jurisdiction unacceptable"); Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. Costruzioni
Aeronautiche Giovanni Agusta, S.p.A., 553 F. Supp. 328, 333 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (French
manufacturer of ball bearings "did not in any way attempt to restrict its market or
limit the states in which its bearings could be sold"); Charles Gendler & Co. v.
Telecom Equip. Corp., 102 N.J. 460, 481, 508 A.2d 1127, 1138 (1986) (manufacturer
can avoid jurisdiction by "attempting to preclude the distribution and sale of its products in the forum state"); Martinez v. American Standard, 91 A.D.2d 652, 457
N.Y.S.2d 97 (App. Div. 1982) (jurisdiction not properly exercised over foreign component manufacturer where there was no evidence that this manufacturer made "a discernible effort to serve, directly or indirectly, a market in the forum state").
" The Supreme Court has never specifically determined the extent to which the
stream of commerce doctrine applies to component manufacturers. Much of the confusion stems from the citation made by the Volkswagen Court to Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961). Volkswagen,
444 U.S. at 298. Gray held that jurisdiction could properly be asserted over a foreign
component manufacturer which delivered its products into the stream of commerce with
the expectation that they would be purchased by consumers in the forum state.
It is not clear whether the Volkswagen Court cited Gray to affirm that decision,
see, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 107 S. Ct. 1026, 1037 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting); Oswalt v. Scripto, Inc., 616 F.2d 191, 201-02 (5th
Cir. 1980), or merely to acknowledge it as the leading source of the stream of commerce
doctrine. See, e.g., Humble v. Toyota Motor Co., 727 F.2d 709, 711 (8th Cir. 1984)
(Japanese car seat manufacturer who sold seats to Japanese car manufacturer did not
place allegedly defective seats in "stream of American commerce" for sale to injured
Iowa plaintiff). Prior to Asahi, the Supreme Court hinted at the latter position. Eschmann Bros. & Walsh, Ltd. v. Mueller & Co., 444 U.S. 1063 (1980). In Eschmann, an
English manufacturer sold allegedly defective components to an Illinois manufacturer,
who incorporated the components into medical instruments. The instruments were then
sold throughout the United States and injured the Colorado plaintiff. The Supreme
Court vacated the judgment rendered against the alien component manufacturer and
remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Volkswagen. Petitioner's Brief at 20,
Asahi, 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987) (No. 85-693). Asahi itself did nothing to resolve the
question: three justices agreed with Justice Brennan, who, as noted above, seemed to
believe that Volkswagen affirmed the stream of commerce doctrine outlined in Gray;
three other justices, on the other hand, agreed with Justice O'Connor, who did not
explicitly mention Volkswagen's reference to Gray. For a discussion of the conflicting
interpretations of Volkswagen, see Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1032-33. See also Comment,
supra note 72, at 160-61.
0 In this respect, it is difficult to see how the stream of commerce doctrine applies
at all to the component manufacturer. The component manufacturer derives its economic benefits from its contract with the primary manufacturer; and, while it would be
unrealistic for a component manufacturer to assume that its parts will not eventually be
incorporated into finished products and sold to consumers in various states, the sale of
parts to a primary manufacturer does not constitute "purposeful avail[ment] . . . of the
• . . benefits and protections of [the forum state's] laws." Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S.
235, 253 (1958); see Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1033 (plurality adopting similar position).
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Usually, component manufacturers do not control the marketing and
distribution scheme of the finished product; 9 nor, judging from the emphasis placed by the courts on the conduct of the primary manufacturers, are they expected to do so.92 This limited ability to control the
marketing and distribution decisions has raised concern that component
manufacturers are far more likely than primary manufacturers to be
victimized by aggressive assertion of long-arm jurisdiction. The reasons
for this concern are evident. It may be assumed that a state would be
deterred from excessive application of its long-arm statute by the possibility that a primary manufacturer would, "if the risks [became] too
great, sever its connection with the State.""3 But the component manufacturer exerts no such deterrent effect on a state: because the component manufacturer usually has less control over the ultimate destination
of its products than the primary manufacturer, "the State is not adequately restrained by the possibility that the [manufacturer] will withdraw from its markets. ' 94 Because they have a limited - if not nonexistent - capacity to structure their conduct to avoid suit in a particular
state, component manufacturers should not be subjected to the same
standards of conduct applied to primary manufacturers.
3.2. The PotentialChilling Effect of the United States' Product Liability/ Insurance Crisis on International Trade
The efforts exerted by alien manufacturers to resist United States'
Profits reaped by the component manufacturer from the ultimate sale of the finished
product need not change this conclusion: the Volkswagen Court stated that mere "financial benefits accruing to the defendant from a collateral relation to the forum State
will not support jurisdiction . . . ." 444 U.S. at 299.
S1In several cases, courts have deemed relevant to the jurisdictional analysis the
fact that the component manufacturers did not control the marketing or distribution of
finished products. Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1033; Humble v. Toyota Motor Co., 727 F.2d
709, 710 (8th Cir. 1984); Bean Dredging Corp. v. Dredge Technology Corp., 744 F.2d
1081, 1085 (5th Cir. 1984) (upholding jurisdiction); cf Stavro, Riding the Tiger,
FORBES, Oct. 8, 1984, at 181 (discussing the limited decision-making capacity of a
subassembly contractor to IBM). One court has, however, upheld jurisdiction partly
because the component part was uniquely designed for consumers in the forum.
Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. Costruzioni Aeronautiche Giovanni Agusta, S.p.A., 553 F.
Supp. 328, 330 (E.D. Pa. 1982), cited with approval in Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1033.
Other cases in which component manufacturers have actively participated in decisions
regarding finished products are cited infra note 159.
"' See cases cited supra note 88.
93 World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 286, 297 (1980), quoted
with approval in Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1032.
" Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due ProcessLimitations on State CourtJurisdiction, 1980 Sup. CT. REV. 77, 96. But see Lilly, supra note 65, at 125 (stating
that "the alien defendant will often be indifferent to whether the suit against him is
filed in State A or State B").
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assertions of jurisdiction can best be explained by the fear with which
alien tribunals regard the "fabulous damages" routinely awarded in
United States' product liability cases.95 The wording of many long-arm
statutes suggests that it might not be possible to decide the jurisdictional
issue without also deciding the outcome of the underlying dispute.96
To suggest that an alien component manufacturer faced with the
prospect of large adverse damage awards can "simply . . .purchase
liability insurance to defray expenses incurred in litigating abroad"' 7 is
somewhat cavalier in light of the liability insurance crisis currently afflicting domestic manufacturers.9 8 Testifying in 1978 before the House
Subcommittee on Capital, Investment, and Business Opportunities, one
New York Congressman, speaking for a panel of five Congressmen,
noted that manufacturers who responded to a questionnaire were paying more than 300% more for their insurance premiums in 1976 than
they were in 1974.9" These findings were not uncommon. 0 0 The rapid
price increases have particularly harmed the small manufacturer. 0 1
95 Smith Kline & French Laboratories Ltd. v. Bloch, [1983] 2 All E.R. 72, 74
(C.A.) (Denning, J.). See Castanho v. Brown & Root Ltd., [1981] 1 All E.R. 143, 143
(H.L.) (American lawyers persuaded plaintiff to enforce claim in America "where the
damages would probably be much greater"); Gornall & Wharton, Briefing the Foreign
Client on Starting a Business in the United States, 6 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
235, 256-57 (1980).
9'Carrington & Martin, Substantive Interests and the Jurisdiction of State
Courts, 66 MICH. L. REV. 227, 246 (1967); see, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
5322(a)(4) (Purdon 1980) (providing that "[c]ausing harm or tortious injury [in the
state] by an act or omission" outside the state may serve as a basis upon which jurisdiction may be asserted) (emphasis added). For a discussion of the issues that may arise
when a court must consider the merits in order to resolve the jurisdictional question, see
Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Technology Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1284-85, 1285-86
n.2 (9th Cir. 1977).
" Note, Civil Procedure- Long-Arm Statutes -Jurisdiction Over Alien Manufacturers in Product Liability Actions, 18 WAYNE L. REV. 1585, 1592 (1972).
98 The concern about the product liability and insurance crisis is not limited to the
United States. See generally Orban, Product Liability: A Comparative Legal Restatement - Foreign National Law and the E.E.C. Directive, 8 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
342 (1978); Comment, Federal Product Liability Reform: A Comparison of S.2670
and the System in the United Kingdom, 9 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. LAW 265 (1987).
"' SUBCOMM.

ON CAPITAL, INVESTMENT,

AND BUSINESS

OPPORTUNITIES OF

THE HOUSE COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, PRODUCT LIABILITY INSURANCE, H.R.
REP. No. 997, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1978) (hereinafter REPORT) (presentation of

Hon. E. Pattison).
100 Id. Conversely, it has been stated that "product liability insurance costs have
never exceeded 1 percent of gross sales in the vast majority of industries." Hollings,
Preserving the Vitality of Tort Law, TRIAL, Feb. 1984, at 104.
101 See REPORT, supra note 99; Special Report: Liability InsuranceIs Top Issue
at White House Conference, J. AccT., Oct. 1986, at 27 (Liability insurance is a "crisis
(which) has. . . become a life and death sentence to many small businesses." (quoting
The State of Small Business: A Report of the President - Transmitted to the Congress
1986, Together With the Annual Report on Small Business and Competition of the
U.S. Small Business Administration, cited in 22 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1155
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Responding to a survey conducted by the House Subcommittee, the
Hartford Group stated that "[t]he size of the insured company is an
important consideration . . . . If there is a chance of a catastrophic
loss, the larger insured company will very likely generate a premium
commensurate with the risk, but a small company will not." 10 2 Furthermore, the small manufacturer may be unable to renegotiate exorbitant rates once they are quoted: the volume of business done by the
small manufacturer is frequently too small to let it demand that its
rates be set at a level fairly related to its individual loss experience.1 0 3
The result is that "small business . . . people are devastated by the
high cost of liability insurance, if they can get it."'0 4
Notwithstanding the inhibiting effect that large damage awards
have on small domestic manufacturers, 0 5 it is entirely conceivable that
many small alien manufacturers, leery of large damage awards and unable to purchase the necessary insurance, will simply sever all contact
with the United States. For example, commercial manufacturers in the
United Kingdom reacted with harsh language to a proposed United
States/United Kingdom draft convention by which judgments rendered
in this country against British manufacturers would be enforced in the
United Kingdom:
In most relevant cases, this [enforcement] w[ould] result in
what amounts to an abrogation of our legal system in favour
of one containing so many features that are totally abhorrent
to us . . . . The commercial and economic effects on those
manufacturers who export to the United States cannot be
overestimated and it seems likely that this could lead to
many manufacturers withdrawing altogether from the American market."'0
To the extent it deters alien manufacturers from trading with this
country, the extraterritorial application of state long-arm statutes may
constitute a violation of the Commerce Clause of the United States
(Sept. 15, 1986))).

Report, supra note 99, at 39.
40.
104 Collins, Spotlight Continues to Shine on Liability Issue, J. AcCT., May 1986,
at 48.
102

103Id. at
105

See generally SUBCOMM.

ON ANTITRUST, CONSUMERS AND EMPLOYMENT OF

THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS,
NESS IN THE NATION'S

UNDERUTILIZATION OF SMALL BUSI-

EFFORTS TO ENCOURAGE INDUSTRIAL

REP. No. 1829, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
10 Payne, POLICY, July 1977, at 572, quoted

INNOVATION,

H.R.

in North, The Draft U.K.IU.S.
Judgments Convention: A British Viewpoint, 1 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 219, 229
(1979).
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Constitution. 0 7 More generally, the Asahi Court failed to discuss or
condemn the adverse effect that the California Supreme Court's decision might have had on the free flow of international commerce.',
This failure suggests that if principles of international comity have not
been completely forgotten, they have at least been demeaned.
3.3. Principles of Comity and the Enforcement Abroad ofJudgments
Rendered in the United States
Principles of international comity will likely be denigrated where,
as in Asahi, a United States court focuses its analysis primarily on domestically-developed tests for asserting adjudicatory jurisdiction. In the
domestic setting, the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution'0 9 blurs the line that conceptually separates jurisdiction to adjudicate l 0 from the duty to enforce judgments: 1 1 if valid jurisdiction exists
107 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8. The commerce clause provides that "Congress shall
have the power. . . [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign nations," and it has occasionally been invoked to restrain assertions of jurisdiction by the state courts which place
undue burdens upon interstate commerce. Id.; see Davis v. Farmers Co-Operative Equity Co., 262 U.S. 312 (1923) (statute compelling all foreign interstate carriers to submit to forum's unlimited jurisdiction as precondition of maintaining a soliciting agent
there violates commerce clause). In a famous hypothetical, Judge Sobeloff warned of

the hesitancy a California dealer might feel if asked to sell a set of tires to
a tourist with Pennsylvania license plates, knowing that he might be required to defend in the courts of Pennsylvania a suit for

. . .

heavy dam-

ages in case of [an] accident attributed to a defect in the tires. It is difficult
to conceive of a more serious threat and deterrent to the free flow of commerce between the states.
Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502, 507 (4th Cir. 1956). It
appears plausible that where concern about the jurisdictional reach of United States'
courts deters alien manufacturers from trading with this country, the state in question
has arguably interfered with the federal congressional power to "regulate commerce
with the foreign nations." See Note, supra note 97, at 1592.
It is worth noting that Erlangerwas cited favorably by the Volkswagen Court as
an example of the unintended harm which would afflict national commerce if a manufacturer's actual knowledge were adopted as the type of "foreseeability" germane to the
due process analysis. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 296
(1980); see infra notes 162-65, and accompanying text; supra note 83 and accompanying text.
108 For an argument that the primacy of the concerns of the international commercial community should be asserted, see infra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
109 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
110 "Jurisdiction to adjudicate" is the authority of the state to make its laws applicable to persons or activities. See RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 421 [441] (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985).
1' "Jurisdiction to enforce" is the authority of the state to use its resources of
government to induce or compel compliance with its laws. Id. § 431; see also von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdictionto Adjudicate, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1126 (1966)
(Issues of adjudicatory and enforcement jurisdiction are "separate, though
interrelated.").
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in the rendering state court, the judgment must be recognized and enforced in other states.112 In the international setting, however, the Supreme Court has observed that
[n]o law has any effect, of its own force, beyond the limits of
the sovereignty from which its authority is derived. The extent to which the law of one nation, as put in force within its
territory . . . shall be allowed to operate within the dominion of another nation, depends upon . . "the comity of
nations."' 1 3
A core notion of international comity"" is that the judgments of
alien courts should, whenever possible, be enforced by domestic
15
courts:1
[Enforcement] fosters international cooperation and encourages reciprocity, thereby promoting predictability and stability through the satisfaction of mutual expectations. The interests of both forums are advanced: the foreign court
because its laws and policies have been vindicated; the domestic country because international cooperation and ties
have been strengthened." 6
It is a mistake, however, to conclude that nations will grant indiscriminate credit to alien judgments and will disregard their own minimum standards of justice."17 Japan may be especially reluctant to do so.
Contrary to the United States policy of protracted trials and large damage awards in product liability suits, Japan has established a type of
no-fault, government-administered insurance. Under this program, persons injured by defective products are automatically awarded modest
compensation;" 8 it is unlikely that large damage awards rendered
2
"a

114

on Mehren & Trautman, supra note 111, at 1126.
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895).
"Comity" has been defined as

the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both
to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens
or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.
Hilton, 159 U.S. at 163-64; see also Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines,
731 F.2d 909, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1984). For a discussion of the judicial concerns over
comity in a different context, see Comment, The SEC and Foreign Blocking Statutes:
Need for a Balanced Approach, 9 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 551 (1987).
"I Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 937.
116 Id.
1

Cf Hilton, 159 U.S. at 164-65 (citing J.

CONFLICT OF LAWS
118

§ 28 (1834)).

STORY,

COMMENTARIES ON THE

Sh-hi Seikatsu YouSeihin Anzen HU (Consumer Products Safety Act), Law
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abroad would be unhesitantly enforced.11 9 European countries are similarly wary. The Netherlands simply refuses to enforce any judgment
rendered abroad. 20 France claims exclusive jurisdiction over lawsuits to
which her citizens are parties and will not recognize the judgment of an
alien court against a French citizen." 1 West Germany determines
whether alien judgments will be enforced by extrapolating from the bases on which adjudicatory jurisdiction is assumed: 122 a judgment rendered against a German defendant who has assets in the rendering nation1 23 or who has appeared and been served in the rendering forum'2 4
will be enforced in Germany. England also will enforce alien judgments if an "acceptable" base of adjudicatory jurisdiction, which includes either personal service on the English defendant within the fovoluntary appearance, was asserted in the
rum or the defendant's
2
original proceeding.1 1
The reluctance to enforce alien judgments can best be explained by
the enforcing country's concern that its citizen was not treated fairly by
the alien tribunal. This concern is well founded. Within the domestic
setting, it has been observed that "the countervailing policies which
favor restraint [in the extraterritorial assertion of long-arm jurisdiction]
No. 31, art. 63 (Japan 1973). For a general discussion of this Act, see 7 DOING BusiNESS IN JAPAN § 4.08[2] (Z. Kitagawa ed. 1983). Amici Brief of California Manufacturers' Association at A-7, Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 107 S. Ct. 1026
(1987) (No. 85-693).
1.9More generally, the Japanese legal system is imbued with the core elements of
the Confucian order. This order discourages even Japanese citizens from litigating their
claims. Because "it was the duty of the faithful commoner not to disturb the lord's
peace by becoming too involved in a lawsuit," the Japanese courts impose upon potential plaintiffs stiff litigation taxes and long calendar delays. The Role of the Law and
Lawyers in Japan and the United States, WILSON Q., Autumn 1984, at 46; see also
Chira, To Be Sorely Tried, Try Filinga Lawsuit in Japan, N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1987,
at A4, col. 3 (noting that there exists in Japan "a cultural taboo against resorting to the
courts").
120 WETBOEK VAN BURGERLIJKE RECHTSVORDERING [Rv.] art. 431, § 1 (Neth.);
see von Mehren & Trautman, Recognition of ForeignAdjudications: A Survey and a
Suggested Approach, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1601, 1602 (1968).
121 CODE CIVIL [C. civ.] art. 2123 (Fr.); von Mehren & Trautman, supra note
120, at 1613; H. BATIFOL, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVP § 718 (4th ed. 1967).
122 ZIVILPROZEFlORDNUNG [ZPO] § 328 (W. Ger.). The judgment of an alien
nation will not be enforced "if the courts of the state to which the foreign court belongs
do[] not have jurisdiction under German law." von Mehren & Trautman, supra note
120, at 1611, n.23.
121 West German law provides that "[a]ctions pertaining to property against a
person having no domicile in the interior may be brought before a court in whose
district property of the defendant is situated." ZPO § 23, translated in de Vries &
Lowenfeld, Jurisdictionin PersonalActions - A Comparison of Civil Law Views, 44
IOWA L. REV. 306, 332 (1959).
124 ZPO § 23; see von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 120, at 1611 n.23.
125 Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act, 1933, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch.
47, § 4; von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 120, at 1614.
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will have no political outlet in the forum state. .

.

. Long-arm legisla-

tion applies only to those who are not constituents, and usually favors
those who are."12' 8 The same problem exists in the international setting,
and it is particularly acute with respect to the civil law countries. In
these countries, the rules for international litigation were promulgated
at a time when international cooperation in that field was unknown;
the resulting bases upon which jurisdiction may be asserted are notoriously chauvinistic.1 27 By forcing the plaintiff to sue the defendant in a
forum in which the defendant has voluntarily appeared, the traditional
rules of recognition attempt to provide at least a minimum assurance
that the defendant will not be treated unfairly."' 8 But long-arm statutes
permit the plaintiff to "call the defendant to him" and their increased
use has heightened concern that the alien defendant might not be
treated fairly. Consequently, it has been observed that, "when the
plaintiff in the original proceeding is seeking to derive advantage from
a judgment in his favor, recognition

.

. .

becomes correspondingly more

problematical." '2 9
Although the assertion of jurisdiction over alien manufacturers obviously cannot depend on the attitude of the enforcing nation, the assertion should at least show a respectful regard for the more conservative
views of other nations. Domestic courts would do well to recognize that
assertions of jurisdiction based on comparatively intangible concepts,
such as "minimum contacts" or "purposeful availment," are, from the
outset, likely to be regarded with suspicion by nations requiring either
personal presence and service, or the presence of assets.1 30 The aggressive assertion of such domestic jurisdictional bases is likely to have serious repercussions: von Mehren and Trautman have warned that "a
legal system cannot confine its analysis solely to its own ideas of what
is just, appropriate, and convenient .

. .

. Conduct that is overly self-

regarding with respect to the taking and exercise of jurisdiction can
disturb the international order and produce political, legal, and economic reprisals."1 '
226

Carrington & Martin, supra note 96, at 237.

"' De Winter, Excessive Jurisdictionin PrivateInternationalLaw, 17 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 706, 706-08 (1968).2 on Mehren & Trautman, supra note 120, at 1616. For a discussion of the
principle of recognition, see Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895); G.
CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
12

LAW 537-38 (7th ed. 1965).

von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 120, at 1616.
1"' See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
131 von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 111, at 1127; see also North, supra
note 106, at 236 (noting fierce opposition to the jurisdictional provision by which judgments rendered in the United States against British manufacturers would be enforced
in the United Kingdom); Amici Brief of the American Chamber of Commerce in the
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TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION

4.1. "Reasonableness" and the Needs of the InternationalCommercial Community
From the previous section, it may be concluded that the assertion
of jurisdiction by a plaintiff in one country over a defendant in another
must be "reasonable" in an international sense. Comity notwithstanding, the international legal system is consensual: nations are not bound
to enforce judgments rendered by other nations, and reasonableness,
within this context, is a prerequisite to the extraterritorial assertion of
jurisdiction."a 2 Within the domestic setting, the assertion of jurisdiction
over a foreign defendant is said to be reasonable if the defendant has
certain "minimum contacts" with the forum. 33 Within the international setting, however, this test is inadequate in several respects. Leaving aside the unjustified hardships that such a test works against the
domestic plaintiff,3 4 domestically-developed jurisdictional tests will
necessarily apply domestic notions of "fair play and substantial jusUnited Kingdom and the Confederation of British Industry at 11 n.6, Asahi Metal
Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987) (No. 85-693) (noting that negotiations on the draft convention were broken off in part because of British manufacturers'
concerns that the jurisdictional provision would subject them to excessive product liability damages).
132 These principles are recognized by the RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981). Section 403(1)
provides that even if a country acquires prescriptive jurisdiction through § 402, "a state
may not apply law to the conduct, relations, status or things having connection with
another state . . . when the exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable." Id. § 403(1).
Section 403(2) lists various factors which the court should consider to determine
whether the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable.
The reasonableness test set forth in § 403(2) may, however, be circumvented. Although § 403 requires reasonableness to be assessed in light of the § 403(2) factors, §
415(2) provides that where the "principal purpose" of the defendant's contact with the
forum is to "affect" United States commerce, no specific § 403(2) examination is required. See Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d at 909 n.152
(D.C. Cir. 1984).
'ssInternational Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
134 Professor Lilly argues that the minimum contacts test is premised on the tacit
assumption that in the domestic setting, at least two fora are available to the domestic
plaintiff: if jurisdiction fails in the plaintiff's own state for want of minimum contacts,
it can be invoked in the state in which the defendant is incorporated. In the international setting, however, the strict requirement that the alien corporation have minimum
contacts with the plaintiff's particular state will often lead to the complete failure of
jurisdiction within this country. Lilly, supra note 65, at 124. Lilly goes on to state that
because "[t]here is no apparent basis in InternationalShoe and its offspring for permitting a state to extend its in personam jurisdiction beyond the generally applicable
constitutional limits simply on the ground that the defendant is an alien," this problem
cannot be remedied by aggregating the alien defendant's contacts with the entire nation.
Id. at 127; see Superior Coal Co. v. Ruhrkohle A.G., 83 F.R.D. 414, 419 (E.D. Pa.
1979) (listing cases which require that the alien defendant have sufficient contact with
the plaintiff's particular state).
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tice":13 5 considerations of international comity will be either omitted
from the analysis or relegated to positions of secondary importance.
More important, the domestic minimum contacts test focuses the assessment of reasonableness solely upon the competing interests of the actual
litigants.' 3 6 Reasonableness, in the international commercial setting,
must be assessed in light of the paramount interest of the United States
in maintaining a reciprocally fair system for transnational interaction.13 7 Professor Maier has, therefore, stated that international assessments of reasonableness must be made "with special reference to the
importance of maintaining jurisdictional rules that will support, ease
and encourage international economic and social intercourse."'3s
The Supreme Court has, in other areas of the law, consistently
asserted the primacy of international commercial considerations. In The
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,' the Court enforced a forum-selection clause in a contract between German and American merchants.
The clause specified that any disputes arising under the contract were
to be resolved in the United Kingdom. The Court noted that forumselection clauses had generally been disfavored by United States courts:
such clauses were usually held to be "contrary to public policy" and
were not enforced.' 4 The Court, however, was more concerned with
the realities of international commerce than with providing the United
States plaintiff with the most convenient forum:
For at least two decades we have witnessed an expansion of
overseas commercial activities by business enterprises based
in the United States . . . . The expansion . . . will hardly
be encouraged if, notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist
135 International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. The Supreme Court has specifically
warned that "[to determine that 'American standards of fairness' . . . must nonetheless
govern [a] controversy [involving extremely attenuated contact between a German corporation and the United States] demeans the standards of justice elsewhere in the
world, and unnecessarily exalts the primacy of United States law over the laws of other
countries." Scherk v. Alberto-Culver, 417 U.S. 506, 517 n.11 (1974).
136 See, e.g., Omstead v. Brader Heaters, Inc., 5 Wash. App. 258, 270-71, 487
P.2d 234, 242 (1971). Similarly, the California Supreme Court focused its inquiry on
California's "strong interest" in protecting its resident consumers, administering its
laws in an orderly fashion, and reducing the likelihood of inconsistent verdicts. Asahi
Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 39 Cal. 3d 35, 53, 702 P.2d 543, 553, 216 Cal. Rptr.
385, 395 (1985); see also Hedrick v. Daiko Shoji Co., 715 F.2d 1355, 1359 (9th Cir.
1983); Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Ct., 71 Cal. 2d 893, 899, 458 P.2d 57, 62, 80
Cal. Rptr. 113, 118 (1969).
137 Maier, Extraterritorial
Jurisdictionat a Crossroads:An Interaction Between
Public and PrivateInternationalLaw, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 280, 301 (1982).
138 Id. at 303.
139 407 U.S. 1 (1971).
140 Id. at 8; see, e.g., Carbon Black Export, Inc. v. The SS Monrosa, 254 F.2d
297, 300-01 (5th Cir. 1958).
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on a parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved
under our laws and in our courts .

. .

. We cannot have

trade and commerce in world markets and international waters [resolved] exclusively on our [own] terms. 4
The Court concluded that "present-day commercial realities" and "expanding international trade" mandated the enforcement of choice-offorum provisions. 4 2
The Court itself has indicated that controversies carrying international commercial implications must be governed by special considerations. In Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. ,'" the Court upheld an arbitration clause providing that the International Chamber of Commerce in
Paris would resolve all disputes arising under a contract for the sale of
three German corporations by Scherk to Alberto-Culver, a United
States corporation. Alberto-Culver alleged that Scherk had falsely
stated that the trademarks owned by the corporations were unencumbered. Alberto-Culver alleged that this violated the Securities Exchange
Act of 19344 and Rule 1Ob-5.' 5 To avoid the arbitration clause, Alberto-Culver relied on Wilko v. Swan.' 46 In that case, the Court, dealing with two domestic corporations, found that arbitration and choiceof-law provisions were the sorts of "stipulation[s] [that could not] be
waived under . . . the Securities Exchange Act.' 4 ' The Court in
Scherk, however, refused to let the policies embodied in the Securities
Exchange Act override the special need to infuse stability and predictability into the international commercial system:
A contractual provision specifying in advance the forum in
which disputes shall be litigated

. . .

is

. .

.an almost indis-

pensible precondition to achievement of the orderliness and
predictability essential to any international business transaction ....

. .[T]he
[
dicey atmosphere [which results from a system in which such provisions are not enforced] would surely
damage the fabric of international commerce and trade, and
imperil the willingness and ability of businessmen to enter
The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 8-9.
Id. at 15. The Court noted that such a clause would not be enforced if there
were a "strong showing that it should be set aside." Id; see also Maier, supra note 137,
at 312-13.
141
141

143

144
145

146
147

417 U.S. 506 (1974).
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh (1980).
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1986).
346 U.S. 427 (1953).
Id. at 434-35.
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into international commercial agreements.1 4

4.2. Serving the Needs of the InternationalCommercial Community
4.2.1. Presumption of Unreasonableness
Several conclusions follow from the previous section. First, the primacy of the needs of the international commercial community must be
asserted: only in this way will stability and predictability be infused
into the international system." 9 For the same reason, the jurisdictional
test governing situations similar to Asahi should be easy to apply and,
to some extent, outcome-determinative."8 Finally, no state should assert jurisdiction over any manufacturer which could not structure its
conduct to avoid suit there: 15' fundamental principles of fairness" 2 will
be denigrated if this is not the case. The principal inquiry should,
therefore, relate to the particular position each manufacturer occupies
in the production/distribution chain; assertions of jurisdiction over
manufacturers occupying secondary positions in the chain will be presumptively unreasonable.'
The presumption set forth above is satisfactory for several reasons.
First, the inquiry into the particular position each alien manufacturer
occupies in the production/distribution chain constitutes the logical extension of present inquiries: lower courts have already distinguished between primary and secondary manufacturers, and have constrained the
scope of jurisdiction to which the latter can be exposed.154 Second, the
148 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver, 417 U.S. 506, 516-17 (1974). For a general discussion of the comity interests raised by extraterritorial assertions of jurisdiction by the
Securities and Exchange Commission, see Comment, supra note 114.
Professor Maier notes that the Supreme Court has in other areas of the law
evinced a similar desire to infuse the international commercial system with stability. See

Maier, supra note 137, at 304-12.
148 See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
150 The quest for an outcome-determinative test is not unique to the international
setting. Domestically, it has been noted that there have been efforts - principally
through focusing attention on the activity of the defendant - to "build the minimum
contacts test into a rigid test, good for all occasions." Carrington & Martin, supra note
96, at 239-40.
151 See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
151 For a general discussion concerning the role of "fairness" in assertions of jurisdiction, see Case Comment, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 11 CUMB. L.
REV. 481 (1980); Case Comment, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 32 U.
FLA. L. REV. 795 (1980).
153 For a discussion of the manner in which this presumption may be rebutted, see
infra Section 4.2.2.
1" See Nelson v. Park Indus., 717 F.2d 1120, 1125 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
465 U.S. 1024 (1984); Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. Costruzioni Aeronautische Giovanni
Agusta, S.p.A., 533 F. Supp. 328, 332 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Charles Gendler & Co. v.
Telecom Equip. Corp., 102 N.J. 460, 478, 508 A.2d 1127, 1136 (1986). This concept
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inquiry is fair: primary manufacturers and those closest to them on the
production chain are best able to structure the distribution scheme to
avoid suit in a particular, distant forum.1 5 Third, the results of the
presumption will accord with the reasonable expectations of the parties.
Because they derive their profits from the sale of finished products, primary manufacturers usually establish broad distribution schemes that
serve the largest possible markets.15 A primary manufacturer cannot in
good faith argue that it is not amenable to suit in a forum within the
market it chose to exploit. The secondary manufacturer, however, derives its greatest economic benefit from its contract with the primary
manufacturer, and only collateral benefit from the eventual sale of the
finished product. The secondary manufacturer would not, therefore,
reasonably expect the minor benefit derived from the sale of the product to a distant forum to carry with it the concomitant burden of defending a product liability suit there. Finally, because it will usually
force only primary manufacturers to litigate in American courts, the
presumption ensures that the United States will make the smallest possible intrusion into the international commercial system.' 57
is merely extended one step further when the scope of jurisdiction to which a component manufacturer can be exposed is similarly constrained. The component manufacturer is, functionally, a secondary manufacturer: like local retailers who avail themselves primarily of the benefits of particular, local markets, component manufacturers
avail themselves primarily of the benefits of the contract formed with the primary manufacturer. See Max Daetwyler Corp. v. R. Meyer, 762 F.2d 290, 303 (3d Cir. 1985)
(Sloviter, J., dissenting) (noting that "the benefit derived by manufacturerswho place
their products in the stream of commerce is far different from the mere derivative benefit received by distributors and analogous defendants . . ... ") (second emphasis
added).
"I' See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text. Evidence that a secondary manufacturer in some way controlled or actively participated in the distribution scheme
may rebut the presumption that the assertion of jurisdiction over it is unreasonable. See
infra Section 4.2.2.
"'Dejames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 285 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1085 (1981); Gendler, 102 N.J. at 478, 508 A.2d at 1136-37; see also

Note, The Long Arm Reach of the Courts Under the Effects Test After Kulko v. Superior Court, 65 VA. L. REV. 175, 179 (1979) (discussing the reasonable expectations of
corporations marketing their goods in interstate commerce).
"57 See supra Section 4.1. This result does not significantly compromise the rights
of an injured plaintiff: because the primary manufacturer usually has the "deepest
pocket," the domestic plaintiff should be adequately compensated without joining every
participant in the production chain. Cf. Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d
453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring) (stating that one reason
for introducing strict liability into the product liability area was that the primary manufacturer was in the best position to insure against the risk of injury and distribute to
the public the costs incurred therein).
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4.2.2. Rebutting the Presumption:Participationin the Distribution
Scheme and Factors of Secondary Importance
The presumption outlined above is based partly on the assumption
that alien component manufacturers do not control the scheme by
which the finished product is distributed.15 Consequently, the basis of
the presumption is undermined when an alien component manufacturer
helps to decide where the finished product is to be distributed:1" 9 the
component manufacturer in that case cannot complain that it could not
prevent its components from being swept into a distant forum. Where
an alien component manufacturer plays an active role in distribution
decisions, the court should determine whether jurisdiction may properly
be asserted by balancing the needs of the international commercial community160 against the secondary factors set forth below. Although the
factors may individually be of limited importance, they may collectively
rebut the presumption which ordinarily arises.
Subjective Knowledge. An inquiry into whether each defendant
manufacturer was subjectively aware of the ultimate destination of the
finished product should be of minor importance. 61 Such an inquiry
will, first, require the judiciary to expend additional resources ascertaining each defendant's subjective awareness.16 ' The problem is exac158 See supra note 91 and accompanying
189 See, e.g., Hendrickson v. Reg 0 Co.,

text.
657 F.2d 9, 15 (3d Cir. 1981) (component part manufacturer has "not only placed its products in the stream of commerce"
but has "actively worked to retain its forum customers' good will and future patronage
by selling repair parts, additional goods, and furnishing technical advice and assistance"); Allen Organ Co. v. Kawai Musical Instruments Mfg., 593 F. Supp. 107, 111
(E.D. Pa. 1984) (Japanese manufacturer and American distributor are, for practical
purposes, the same company); Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. Construzioni Aeronautische Giovanni Agusta, S.p.A., 553 F. Supp. at 328, 329-30 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (French ball bearing manufacturer "[wiorks closely" with primary manufacturer and has exclusive
agreement with California corporation to promote or sell finished product); see also
Max Daetwyler Corp. v. R. Meyer, 762 F.2d 290, 299 (3d Cir. 1985) (collecting cases
in which "the [secondary] manufacturers involved . . . made deliberate decisions to
market their products in the forum state"); Metrix Warehouse, Inc. v. Daimler-Benz
Akteingesellschaft, 716 F.2d 245 (4th Cir. 1983) (component manufacturer attempts to
affect policy regarding distribution of its products).
"8o See supra Section 4.1.
181 Recent opinions, unfortunately, make this factor the focus of analysis. See, e.g.,
Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 107 S. Ct. 1026, 1035 (1987) (Brennan, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (arguing that "the stream of commerce refers . . . to the
regular and anticipated flow of products from manufacture to distribution to retail");
Nelson v. Park Indus., 717 F.2d 1120, 1125-26, (7th Cir. 1983) ("[Iln determining
whether it is reasonable to hale [defendants] into court . . . a critical fact is whether
these defendants are aware of the distribution system.").
1 2 Carrington and Martin have observed that jurisdictional issues which depend
on specific questions of fact for their resolution "may become so intolerably complex
that our judicial operations will become overburdened, or top-heavy, with preliminary
issues." Carrington & Martin, supra note 96, at 246-47; see, e.g., United States v.
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erbated if constructive awareness is imputed to manufacturers. 16 The
imposition of jurisdictional burdens on defendant manufacturers who
"knew or should have known" the ultimate destination of the product
may significantly increase the costs of each transaction: secondary manufacturers will have to invest considerable costs to ascertain this destination, determine whether they are willing to assume the risks of litigating there, and, perhaps, negotiate with the primary manufacturer
concerning a restricted scope of distribution.0
Interest of Plaintiffs State. The interest of the plaintiff's state in
providing resident consumers with a convenient forum in which to litigate1 65 is also of reduced importance. As noted above, the Supreme
Court has in other areas of the law stressed that the interests of the
particular parties to a lawsuit and their respective countries must defer
to the paramount interest of the United States in maintaining a "reciprocally fair system for transnational interaction."' 6 Where both parties
to a lawsuit implicating international commerce are aliens, a state
should be extremely reluctant to exercise jurisdiction. Notwithstanding
the fact that a state in such circumstances would have no interest in
providing its residents with a convenient forum, the application of
United States law to a dispute that involves only alien parties would
have a disruptive effect on the international system.' 6 7 The alien parties
would also be forced to litigate in an unfamiliar legal system, and it is
unlikely that this confusion would be greatly dispelled by the application of alien law in the United States court.'6 8 The absence of a domestic litigant also suggests that the case would be more properly litigated
abroad, 69 a result that would be welcomed by overburdened domestic
Montreal Trust Co., 35 F.R.D. 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (full and separate hearing to
decide jurisdictional facts).
16' See, e.g., DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 285 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1085 (1981); Oswalt v. Scripto, Inc., 616 F.2d 191, 197
n.8 (5th Cir. 1980).
11 See generally Jackson, Perspectives on the Jurisprudence of International
Trade: Costs and Benefits of Legal Procedures in the United States, 82 MIcH. L.
REV. 1570 (1984) (describing costs of doing business within the United States legal
framework).
16 See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 39 Cal. 3d 35, 53, 702 P.2d
543, 553, 216 Cal. Rptr. 385, 395 (1985).
16 Maier, supra note 137, at 306.
161 See, e.g., Benz v. Compania Naviera Hildago, 353 U.S. 138 (1956) (application of NLRA).
18 Even if alien law were applied in a United States court, the trial would necessarily involve domestic procedures confusing to the litigants. Amici Brief of the American Chamber of Commerce in the United Kingdom and the Confederation of British
Industry at 14, n.9, Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 107 S.Ct. 1026 (1987)
(No. 85-693).
16' See generally Comment, RestoringJustice to the Doctrine of Forum Non Con-
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courts.

Place of Injury. The forum in which a particular plaintiff was
injured by an alleged defect is also of limited importance. In Romero v.
International Terminal Operating Co.,"' the Supreme Court indicated that the place where a plaintiff was injured was not a relevant
consideration in international transactions. The Court observed that
adopting the place-of-injury rule as the dispositive factor in a Jones Act
case would be "disruptive of international commerce" because the rule
"[did] not fit the accommodations that become relevant in fair and prudent regard for the interests of foreign nations."" 2 While a forum may
well have a legitimate interest in providing its plaintiff with a convenient forum, 1 7 3 this interest will nearly always be outweighed by the

interests of the international commercial community. This factor
should, accordingly, be given very little weight in determining whether
or not to assert jurisdiction over a particular manufacturer.
5.

CONCLUSION

Domestically developed and aggressively applied jurisdictional
principles have no place in the international commercial setting. This is
particularly true with respect to secondary manufacturers who cannot
structure the scheme of distribution in order to avoid the jurisdiction of
a particular forum. The spectre of liability under United States product
liability laws may be sufficient to deter small alien manufacturers from
dealing with this country. By subjecting only those manufacturers who
occupy primary positions on the production/distribution chain to litigate in distant fora, the United States promotes a predictable, minimally-intrusive base of jurisdiction. In this manner, international comity will be fostered, and a reciprocally fair system for international
interaction will be maintained.

veniens, 8 J. CoMP. Bus. & CAP. MARKET L. 169, 177-81 (1986); Note, Forum NonConveniens and the Foreign Plaintiffsin FederalCourts,69 GEo. L.J. 1257, 1264-68

(1981).

170 The dissenters in the California Supreme Court's decision of Asahi noted that
the adjudication in this country of a dispute between two aliens constituted a mismanagement of judicial resources: "[California's] overburdened courts should be concerned
with disputes that more directly involve California." 39 Cal. 3d at 56, 702 P.2d at 555,
216 Cal. Rptr. at 397.
171 358 U.S. 354 (1959).
172 Id. at 384.
173 See supra note 137.
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